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ABSTRACT 
 
 In an effort to build a modern transportation system, an economically bankrupt 
Qing government approved the funding and construction of provincial railways. When 
these provinces proved incapable of building these projects, the central government 
nationalized every proposed railway line to facilitate construction using foreign loans. 
These loans gave foreign powers considerable leverage in determining China’s future 
railway network. With the central government ignoring local economic and political 
concerns over these actions, Sichuan province experienced outbreaks of protest over 
railway sovereignty.  
 While these issues have been discussed by many scholars, the role of government 
policy in creating the conditions for protest has not been fully explored. The Qing 
government’s policy of ignoring a politically and geographically isolated province belied 
Sichuan’s increasing importance, both economically and militarily, in the empire. 
Economically, government actions restricted the means of raising railway funds and a 
tolerated system of corruption drained the funding already accrued. Politically, the central 
government promoted a national self-strengthening program centered on the training of 
overseas students. In Sichuan, these returned students achieved limited political success, 
but their authority was curtailed by government leaders more concerned with protecting 
the dynasty. These students then formed an alternative power structure by merging with a 
secret society in an effort to protect provincial sovereignty. When conflict finally broke
 iv 
out, Qing officials found that prior military policies focusing on Sichuan’s Tibetan 
frontier aided in their defeat. By analyzing the Qing government’s economic, political, 
and military policies, this thesis argues that government interference in provincial 
concerns was the central factor in creating a unified, revolutionary society and in its 
success.
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Since their invention in the nineteenth century, railways were the primary means 
of connecting an ever-shrinking world in both time and place. They were particularly 
instrumental in the creation of nation states. In 1911 Sichuan,1 however, a railway 
became the catalyst for revolution between a local populace willing to join the empire 
only on its own terms and a central government that seemed to breed discontent with its 
every action. Ironically, this separation was over a railway that at the time had seen 
almost no construction. Rather, the local populace fought for what the railway 
represented to them. While a few scholars have studied the history of the Railway Rights 
Recovery Movement2 and the subsequent rebellion, the study of government activity 
within this context has received only cursory scrutiny. By observing the friction created 
by economic, political, and military policy, a clear picture of how a revolutionary 
movement was created by government action, or in some cases inaction, will be obtained.  
 In his history of the Sichuan Revolutionary movement, S.C. Yang has a quote that 
encapsulates his view of Sichuan's central place within the 1911 Revolution. He wrote, 
“During the four months that the railroad struggle was on in Sichuan the Manchu
                                                 
1 All Romanization within this work has been converted to Pinyin for consistency. 
2 This Rights Recovery Movement was initially a movement to regain economic rights 
lost during negotiations during the Unequal Treaties with foreign powers. These included 
rights to mines as well as railway lines. In Sichuan, this movement is synonymous with a 




Dynasty was overthrown. What was the reason? There is a proverb: 'In the Empire of 
China when the provinces are experiencing unrest Sichuan is always the first to start 
things.'”3 For S.C. Yang and other provincial leaders, Sichuan was the center of the 
struggle that ended the Qing dynasty. Notwithstanding the immense popularity and focus 
the Sichuan Cause initially enjoyed throughout China, it quickly became superseded by 
events outside the province. Sichuan, despite its growing importance in the waning days 
of the Qing, remained on the periphery of the empire – both politically and 
geographically.  
 Sichuan was considered a backwater during most of the dynasty. Depredations by 
the invading Manchu armies at its conquest depopulated the area, and it still had not 
recovered its standing by the reign of the Emperor Kangxi (1661-1722). In his work on 
Sichuan's political institutions during this period, S.A.M. Adshead wrote, “Down to the 
Taiping Rebellion Sichuan remained in effect an interior off-shore island in relation to the 
main body of the Chinese empire: a continental Taiwan or Hainan; and its political 
importance was relatively slight except in times of crisis on the Tibetan border.”4 
Accentuating its political separation, Sichuan also remained remote because of the 
isolation of the province by its mountainous terrain and a series of treacherous rapids in 
the Yangzi River above Yichang. Although roads existed, they were not useful in the 
transportation of goods owing to the steepness of the mountains. Thus while an overland 
                                                 
3 Shao-ch'üan (S.C.) Yang, “The Revolution in Szechwan, 1911-1912,” West China 
Border Research Society 4 (1933-1934): 69. Yang Shaoquan’s observations are critical 
for this work. In addition to being an eyewitness of these events, he was selected as a 
foreign minister during the time between the success of the rebellion and Sichuan 
subsequently joining the Republic of China. 
4 Samuel Adrian M. (S.A.M) Adshead, Province and Politics in Imperial China: 




journey from Chongqing to Chengdu may have taken roughly ten days for people to 
travel by foot, “goods conveyed up-river from Chongqing are frequently ten or more 
weeks in reaching the capital.”5 
 By the middle of the nineteenth century, this situation radically changed. From 
1850 to 1864, China experienced one of the worst military conflicts in history. Hong 
Xiuquan (1814-1864), a disaffected scholar from Guangdong, started the conflict after 
receiving a vision of a holy war to cleanse China of the Qing. Rebels wrecked the former 
rich provinces in the Jiangnan6 region leaving an untouched Sichuan as one of the 
wealthier provinces in the Chinese empire. As Sichuan's power and position in the empire 
increased in the second half of the nineteenth century, its wealth supported other 
provinces decimated by the rebellion.7 Between the recorded years of 1886 to 1900, 
“more revenue was spent outside of the province than in it.”8  
 By the twentieth century, Sichuan was a prize for foreign governments as well as 
the Qing. The report of the Blackburn Chamber of Commerce mission wrote, “Rich in 
everything which goes to support trade, agriculture, mineral wealth, products of skilled 
labour, and the comparative wealth of its people, this province is par excellence the 
                                                 
5 Robert John Davidson and Isaac Mason, Life in West China: Described by Two 
Residents in the Province of Sz-Chwan (London: Headley Brothers, 1905), 36. 
6 The Jiangnan Region was the area of China south of the Yangzi River. It was considered 
the economic and cultural heartland of the empire. In addition, the Taiping Rebellion 
killed tens of millions of people. 
7 Masao Nishikawa, "Shisen horo undō: sono zen'ya no shakai jokyō" [The Railway 
Protection Movement in Sichuan: Social Conditions on the Eve of Movement], (Tōyō 
bunka kenkyūjo kiyō) [Minutes of the Institute of Oriental Culture] 45.3 (1968): 110. In 
his study of Jiangjin County, Nishikawa demonstrates the heavy burden this caused. After 
the Taiping Rebellion, taxes there had increased something like 2.3 times by 1888, and 
5.9 times by 1911.  




market, of all others, it should be our endeavor to gain."9 Because of this potential 
market, foreign powers attempted to gain access rights to build a railway from Hankou in 
Hubei Province to Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan. Xiliang (1853-1917), Governor-
general of Sichuan in 1903, memorialized the Emperor that a railway must be built with 
local funds as a means of cutting off foreign control of this newly proposed railway. He 
wrote, “If we still do not have an officially established provincial railway company and 
still do not call upon all-Chinese capital to build the road and preserve sovereignty, then 
the situation will be indeed perilous.”10 It was from this memorial that the momentum to 
build a railway from Chengdu to Hankou began.11  
 Ways to fund the railway were proposed and provincial leaders propagandized a 
populace increasingly enthusiastic about constructing a locally owned railway. Despite 
this, corruption and inefficient management would prove to be the downfall of the 
project. The Qing government nationalized all of the provincial railway projects and 
secured a loan with the Four Powers to build the system. Movements to retain railway 
rights sprung up in Sichuan, Hunan, and Zhejiang to protest the negotiation of foreign 
loans, which meant foreign control of China's interior. In writing about why opposition to 
foreign control existed, Wang Ching-Chun stated:  
                                                 
9 Frederick S.A. Bourne. Report of the Mission to China of the Blackburn Chamber of 
Commerce 1896- 87 (Manchester: The North-east Lancashire Press Co., 1898), 333. This 
report was an economic survey conducted by British officials in appraising China’s value 
for investment. 
10 “Sichuan zongdu butang xi zouqing zishe Chuan-Han tielu gongsi zhe gao” [Memorial 
sent by Sichuan Governor-general Xiliang about establishing the Chuan-Han Railway 
Company], July 11, 1903, in Chuanlu yuebao [Monthly report of the Sichuan railways] 
vol.1, (1911 May). In Xiaowei Zheng, The Making of Modern Chinese Politics Political 
Culture, Protest Repertoires, and Nationalism in the Sichuan Railway Protection 
Movement (PhD diss., UC San Diego, 2010), 172. Zheng Xiaowei notes that the original 
document was found in the Sichuan Provincial Archives. 




Unlike loans in the United States or the other powers where loan bonds are 
floated in markets in order to create capital for construction, loans negotiated 
in China were delicate diplomatic affairs in addition to their economic 
implications. The Chinese people were increasingly hesitant to increase 
foreign control of China's interior.12 
 
The Court's decision to nationalize the railway galvanized the provincial leadership into 
forming a protest movement. On September 7th, 1911, Viceroy13 Zhao Erfeng (1845–
1911) ordered the arrest of Sichuan Rights Recovery Movement leader Pu Dianjun 
(1875-1934) and eight of his compatriots. Rebellion broke out throughout the province 
with local leaders eventually able force the resignation of the provincial government. Pu 
Dianjun formed a new government until it was overtaken by Nationalists forces, as had 
the rest of China.  
 The literature on the events in Sichuan has long been dominated by the uprising in 
Wuchang by elements of the New Army troops, traditionally considered the beginning of 
the 1911 Revolution.14 For many years the historical purview of these events focused on 
the discussion of whether the Rights Recovery Movement was a revolutionary 
movement. For many scholars, Sichuan remained on the sidelines because the 1911 
Revolution for them began in Wuchang. Joseph Esherick, for example, in his pivotal 
work on the Revolution, focuses his narrative on the events in Hunan and Hubei because 
for him the story begins there. He wrote, “To focus on Hunan and Hubei was a relatively 
easy choice. The revolution erupted in Hubei and spread first to Hunan. These facts have 
                                                 
12 Ching-Chun Wang, “Why the Chinese Oppose Foreign Railway Loans,” The American 
Political Science Review (1910): 365-366. 
13 The title of Viceroy and Governor-general are the same, being translations from the 
same Chinese word - zongdu. Both of these terms will be used interchangeably 
throughout. 
14 The New Army units were created as a modernized force instructed and equipped 
according to Western standards. They were created after China's disastrous defeat in the 




enhanced both the intrinsic importance and the historical record of the revolution in 
Central China.”15 Etō Shinkichi, in his edited volume on the 1911 Revolution, stated that, 
“On October 10, 1911, an anti-Qing revolutionary uprising took place in Wuchang. This 
set off a chain of revolts in the cities and provinces south of the Yangzi (Yangtze) and 
within three months brought to an end two millennia of dynastic rule in China.”16  
Edward J. M. Rhoades, one of a few who addressed the issue of Sichuan directly, stated 
that it was not revolutionary because it sought a “cancellation of the Hu-kuang loan 
agreement and restoration of the railroad to local management – and not a change in 
government itself.”17   
 In an effort to redeem Sichuan, other historians would argue as S.C. Yang did that 
Sichuan was as revolutionary as Wuchang. Charles Hedtke, one of the pivotal writers of 
the Sichuan Movement in English, notes:  
The Sichuanese phase of the Revolution depended upon the gradual 
acceptance by the provincial leadership of a revolutionary solution for their 
political differences with the government. Although these leaders held to a 
constitutional monarchist philosophy until the last months of the Qing period, 
fundamental differences between themselves and the Court over the 
philosophy of politics led them ultimately to accept the revolutionary 
movement as a means of implementing their own political ideals.18  
 
Chinese historian Li Zongyi strengthened Hedtke’s argument by writing that “the 
struggle in Sichuan was not isolated but rather was linked closely with the revolutionary 
situation throughout China.” The Sichuan uprising “gave a strong impetus to 
revolutionary activities in other parts of the country” while benefiting from the massive 
                                                 
15 Joseph Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and 
Hubei (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 2.  
16 Shinkichi Etō, “Introduction.” in The 1911 Revolution in China: Interpretive Essays, 
ed. Shinkichi Etō and Harold Z. Schiffrin. (Tokyo: Univ of Tokyo Press, 1984), xi.  
17 Edward J. M. Rhoads, China's Republican Revolution: The Case for Kwangtung, 1895-
1913 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 273. 
18 Charles H. Hedtke, Reluctant Revolutionaries: Szechwan and the Ch'ing Collapse, 




support from those same revolutionary groups.19 Nishikawa Masao, in his work on 
Sichuan, states that, “This armed struggle, looked on as the 1911 Revolution’s direct 
cause, toppled a more than 2000 year old dynasty’s autocratic rule, establishing Asia’s 
oldest republic. Moreover, this armed struggle not was only the fuse for the 1911 
Revolution, it was two months before Wuchang.”20 
 On the revolutionary nature of the Sichuan rebellion, the matter was finally laid to 
rest by Zheng Xiaowei's brilliant dissertation which provides the most up-to-date review 
of the Sichuan Railway Rights Movement. She has disputed the traditional rendering of 
the 1911 Revolution as “a failure despite the fact that it overthrew the longest-lasting 
imperial system in human history, established a republic, and introduced to a wider group 
of Chinese people the vital conceptions of rights, republicanism, and democracy.”21   She 
argues that the revolutionary movement in Sichuan provides evidence that the arguments 
for its failure – the inability of the revolution to penetrate into China’s countryside, to 
effect change in the social and the cultural structure of China, and to finish the difficult 
task of fighting against imperialism and authoritarianism – did not apply to Sichuan. The 
central point of her dissertation is that wide-spread propaganda created a unified sense of 
economic rights (minquan) and national sovereignty (guoquan) that eroded the 
relationship between the ruler and the people. This erosion gave the people in Sichuan a 
firm concept of citizenship in the public sphere, underscoring the belief that the Qing 
were unfit for a modern China. 
                                                 
19 Zongyi Li, “Chinese Bourgeois Revolutionaries and the Movement to Regain 
Economic Rights Towards the End of the Qing Dynasty,” in The 1911 Revolution – A 
Retrospective After 70 Years, ed. Sheng Hu and Danian Liu (Beijing: New World Press, 
1983), 164. 
20 Nishikawa, 109. 




 The intent of this thesis is to build on the work of Zheng Xiaowei and delve 
deeper into how government policy created and aided the social forces that rebelled and 
overthrew it. I will focus on the economics of railway construction, the creation of local 
leadership, and the military nature of the rebellion. The segment on economics will look 
specifically into why the Sichuanese opposed foreign loans. In addition, it will argue that 
the unique method Sichuan used to raise railway revenue, while effective, provided a 
partial reason for the railway nationalization. The second section will center on the 
creation of local leadership. It will also examine how this newly formed leadership 
merged with secret societies to form a revolutionary movement. Finally, the last section 
will highlight why the Rebellion achieved success despite its inability to decisively 
threaten the provincial government militarily. Rebellion leaders obtained victory in 
Sichuan through weaknesses in Qing strategic calculations over Sichuan's frontier and the 
infighting of government leaders. In sum, Sichuan's revolutionary movement was the 
creation of government incompetence or negligence in not taking Sichuan's concerns 
seriously.   
  
THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN CREATING DISCONTENT 
 
 In May 1911, the central government, citing corruption at the provincial level, 
issued an imperial memorial nationalizing regional railways. The Manchu general 
Duanfang was sent to Hankou to take over the management of both the Canton-Hankou 
line as well as the Sichuan-Hankou line.22 When provincial leaders asked for a delay on 
the seizure of the railway line, the Emperor expressed surprise that Sichuan was not 
grateful for the nationalization program. The response to the provincial memorial states: 
Upon perusing the memorial We are very much surprised. The conversion of 
the railway ownership to the State was decided upon owing to the difficulty in 
raising the necessary capital by the commercial class and the hopelessness of 
ever accomplishing the construction of their lines, in respect of which 
Szechuan is still much worse than Hunan. Moreover, the fact that large sums 
of its money have been involved in bankruptcies, the pocketing of the people's 
fat through “squeeze” and extortion by the intermediaries, hurtful to the people 
and calamitous to the nation, are all common knowledge. The Throne has, 
therefore, authorized the taking over by the State, and the cessation of the 
“capital per rental,” to release the people from their burden.23 
 
Sichuan's method of rent taxation (called zugu) in raising railway revenue was central to 
this criticism. The government believed that railway officials inappropriately raised these 
taxes and that their corruption had wasted revenue. Furthermore, these taxes were 
onerous as the coffers of the railway company had been accumulated by a levee on
                                                 
22 North-China Herald, May 27, 1911, 555. Despite the response of Sichuan, Duanfang 
was a very good choice in that he had been an accomplished official in Liaoning 
Province. His achievements there included the founding of two universities. 
23 Ibid, June 10, 1911, 694. While the phrase “capital per rental” is not exactly defined in 
the newspaper's printing of the Imperial edict, it can be deduced that it must refer to the 
zugu system as the edict suggests that other methods of raising capital must be found. By 
this time in 1911, the zugu was the only real source for capital the province had with 




every level of Sichuan society, or “squeeze” as the central government called it. The 
province's inability to conduct any significant construction of the railway underscored the 
central government's point. By 1911, the railway company had with the effort of 50,000 
laborers, only been able to build about 160 of a proposed 1,980 kilometers of line.24 
 The protestors who enflamed the entire province of Sichuan had an entirely 
different view of these funds. Originally, the zugu started out as an extra tax on 
landowners, yet later became a three percent tax on every household, including tenants 
and debtors, which produced over ten dan, or twenty-five bushels, of grain for railway 
stock. Those that produced less than ten dan were not obligated to pay any tax.25 By the 
time of the 1909 shareholders meeting, voluntary efforts had only gathered 28% of the 15 
million taels with the rest appropriated by shares derived from the zugu.26 It was not just 
those who rented lands or their wealthier patrons who paid the tax. In a study of Jiangjin 
County in Sichuan, Masao Nishikawa found that 78% of peasants contributed to the 
zugu.27 There was a realization among some officials that the extra tax was very 
damaging to the poor people of the province. One Chengdu official wrote, “The capital of 
the railway is gathered from the people of Sichuan. That money is the sweat and blood of 
the little peasants....This is a huge burden for peasants: for the small household, it takes 
                                                 
24 Ibid, April 22, 1911, 208. 
25 “Chuan-Han tielu zong gongsi jigu zhangcheng” [Regulations on levying railway taxes 
of the Chuan-Han Railway Company]. In Zhili Dai, Sichuan bao lu yun dong shi liao hui 
zuan [Collection of historical materials on the Sichuan Railway Protection Movement] 
(Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindaishi yanjiusuo [Academia Sinica Modern History 
Research Institute], 1994), 272. 
26 Mongton Chi Hsu, Railway Problems in China (New York: Columbia University, 
1915), 328. 




them more than ten years to get one share. The profit is hard to see, while the burden is 
hard to get rid of and they suffer from this exploitation.”28 
 Despite this burden, the people of Sichuan had pride in the fact that they had been 
able to raise funds and believed that they could raise more to complete the railway. They 
saw the intervention of the central government into their internal affairs as egregious. Li 
Jieren, a novelist and noted participant in these events, captured the anger that the 
ordinary people in particular were experiencing during this situation. In an interview with 
Han Suyin given later in life, he stated: 
We had sweated eight years for it. More than any other province, we 
Sichuanese had sweated money for our "iron road." Money, money. How much 
money we had paid out nobody will ever know, but all of us, from the brothel 
courtesans to poorest peasant, had sweated money for it. The gentry, who did 
most of the protesting, had paid the least. As usual, from the poor, the already-
ground-to-misery peasant of Sichuan, some millions of silver ounces had 
come, not only the land-rent of three per cent taxes, but the rice tax and salt tax 
of four copper coins per cattie, years and years of life sweat; and now would 
the iron road be taken from us? Even the sedan chair carriers' neck veins 
swelled when they pronounced the words: "Our iron road, sold to foreigners." 
And the craftsmen, the miners and the shopkeepers, and the boatmen and the 
peasants, all of them who did not know what a railway looked like, all were 
angry.29 
 
This disconnect between the government's perception of a benevolent takeover and the 
Sichuanese view of it as stripping them of their economic rights (minquan) forms the first 
part of Zheng Xiaowei's argument. As Zheng Xiaowei writes, “Sichuan's attempts to fund 
an entirely local railway enterprise through the use of an additional tax burden meant that 
every land-holding person in the province had a stake in the success of the railway.”30 
                                                 
28 “Gan Dazhang zou” [Gan Dazhang Memorial], in Sheng Xuanhuai dang'an ziliao 
xuanji [The Archival Documents on Sheng Xuanhuai], Vol. 1, 80-81. Quoted in Zheng, 
190. 
29 Suyin Han, The Crippled Tree: China, Biography, History, Autobiography (New York: 
Putnam, 1965), 230.  




 Zheng Xiaowei, however, falls short in fully explaining how much the 
government played a part in this discord. She acknowledges that the government's 
decision to use foreign loans left it open to foreign dominance, but gives little detail about 
why Sichuan as well as other provinces were so resistant to these loans. In addition, while 
her analysis of the emerging discourse conflating these taxes with ideas of economic 
rights is excellent, she does not explain fully why Sichuan's form of raising revenue was 
so unique as to come to the attention of the imperial government. Also, she makes no 
mention of the policies that led to the fierce reliance on zugu as the only real means of 
revenue.   
 
 
The Influence of Foreign Powers 
 
 The fear that Sichuan experienced over losing the railway to foreign control was 
not imaginary. Before the emergence of provincial railway projects, foreign loans had 
been the predominant method of financing railway construction in China. Railway 
concessions, or spheres of influence, were set aside for foreign owned and operated lines 
built with these loans, thus allowing the foreign powers to exert dominance without 
conquest. The pressure to secure railway loans was substantial as railways were 
exorbitantly expensive. In addition, the Chinese government was near bankruptcy 
because the nation was rebuilding from the Taiping Rebellion and the indemnities for the 
Opium Wars and Boxer Rebellion. By 1906, railway loans had supported the building of 
several lines successfully, including the line from Beijing to Hankou. The Four Powers–
the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany–exerted pressure in applying for a 




 Due to their desires to secure railway concessions, foreign views of the Chinese 
building their own railways were very negative. The new British envoy, Sir John Jordan, 
upon arrival in 1906 exemplified this by stating that “capital investment made by 
provincial enterprises posed a real threat to British interests; and provincial enterprises, 
however promising, would fail in the end.” He also “believed that as yet it was a wasteful 
and time-wasting procedure for the Chinese to build their own railways."31  On the 
Chuan-Han line in particular, a correspondent for the North-China Herald, in 
commenting on its corruption exposé in 1910, wrote, “If the people have learned wisdom 
by their experience, they will adopt the only plan that in existing circumstances can 
provide China with satisfactory railways and they will entrust the construction of the 
railway wholly to foreigners and its subsequent administration in large part to the same 
hands.”32   
 Although the foreign powers were critical of corruption in Chinese politics, they 
employed it to their advantage. After China accepted the necessity of building railways 
for its modernization, foreign railway loans by 1905 would reach a staggering total of 
$300 million.33 This total was too much of an attraction for many to resist corruption. 
Backdoor deals between negotiators and foreign powers tainted the very concept of 
foreign loans. Wang Ching-Chun, writing on the loan situation, writes:  
It is hard to tell how much corruption has actually existed among the officials 
in negotiating foreign loans; it is still more difficult to determine to what 
extent some of the foreign powers really have resorted to the practice of 
bribing in securing privileges; but it is an undeniable fact that the belief of the 
                                                 
31 Kit-Ching Chan Lau, Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy in the Careers of Sir John Jordan and 
Yuän Shih-kải (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1978), 13. 
32 North-China Herald, April 15, 1910, 122-123. 
33 Albert Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844-1916) 




existence of such corruption has been one of the most irritating causes [of 
resistance to foreign loans].34  
 
 The unease felt over the corruption in particular and the idea of foreign loans in 
general may have stemmed from a knowledge of current European modus operandi in its 
colonial possessions, especially in areas of Africa and India controlled by the principal 
colonial power in China, Great Britain. In his work on comparing China's railways to 
those in British controlled Zimbabwe, James Zheng Gao writes that the African chiefs 
provided free labor for railway construction after receiving bribes of cheap European 
goods.35  
 In India, corruption also had its place. While the British controlled most of the 
subcontinent directly, a few princely states did maintain limited sovereignty over large 
areas by swearing allegiance to the British. The largest of these, Hyderabad, provided an 
arena for railway negotiation comparable to China. Tara Sethia writes that in the state of 
Hyderabad, collaborators were distinguished between two types: “one guided by the 
desire to modernize the state through collaborating with the British; the other guided by 
the calculation of personal gain even at the cost of the state whose interest he 
represented.”36 The imperialist power used the corruption among elites for their own gain 
as Hyderabad as well as other princely states built railways using British money spent on 
British materials at the direction of British controllers.37 Sethia summed up the nature of 
British railway imperialism when she wrote, “The introduction of railways in India was 
                                                 
34 Ching-Chun Wang, “Why The Chinese Oppose Foreign Railway Loans,” 367. 
35 James Zheng Gao, Meeting Technologies Advance: Social Change in China and 
Zimbabwe in the Railway Age (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997), 40. 
36 Tara Sethia, “Railways, Raj, and the Indian States: Policy of Collaboration and 
Coercion in Hyderabad,” in Railway Imperialism, ed. Clarence B. Davis (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 105. 




not a response to the local politics or need but originated from the needs and interests of 
several groups in England favoring railway construction in India.”38  Imperial precedent 
had thus been set in other colonial possessions of the European powers. 
 This style of corruption would also play a dominant part in China's railway 
history. The first railway scheme in China, the Wusong Railway, was a British effort 
capitalizing on the corruption of local officials who then attempted to hide its construction 
from their superiors in Beijing. When it was discovered, the government destroyed the 
railway and severely punished these local officials.39 By the 1900s this process had 
reversed itself. Foreign investors were using the corruption of the Court to their 
advantage, as the railway rights movements had almost cut off their access to provincial 
and local elites. James Zheng Gao writes, “The Chinese provincial authorities, possessing 
more local interests and allegiances, often sided with the gentry-merchants in their 
conflicts with foreign investors and the central government on railway issues.”40 
 Another aspect of railways loans, perhaps of more concern than corruption, was 
the use of railways in limiting the transfer of technology and as a means of division. A 
lack of standardization brought chaos to the railway system as each foreign power 
invested in China. Each country that participated used different equipment installations as 
well as operational regulations, telegraph systems, and even nomenclature.41 Competent 
engineers remained another problem. Although Chinese students had been sent abroad to 
study railways, they were too few in number to replace foreign engineers completely. 
                                                 
38 Ibid, 105. 
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Due to this shortage, foreign loan negotiations continued to be the primary means of 
hiring foreign engineers. While China gained experienced workmen, many of these 
conditions gave these foreign enterprises control over engineering, dispatching, 
mechanics, and even accounting.42 Echoing Tara Sethia's view of Britain's railway 
imperialism, Wang Ching-Chun, in writing about the opposition of the Chinese to railway 
loans in 1910, stated that the foreign powers went too far by insisting that “in nearly 
every railway loan that the engineers, accountants, and comptrollers must be their 
subjects, that the power to judge and receive material must rest in their hands, and that 
the material itself must also be bought from their merchants.”43 
 Years later when the insolvency of local efforts in railway construction made a 
railway loan necessary, local elites saw the realization of their fears when the negotiations 
split the length of the line in three parts. The Germans ceded the section from Hankou to 
Yichang, the British from Yicheng to Chengdu, and the French gained possession of any 
line past Chengdu.44 In addressing Sichuan's reaction to the necessity of a foreign loan, 
Wang Ching-Chun notes, “the people are not opposed to foreign loans in principle, but 
are opposed to this particular loan and the conditions under which it was concluded. They 
wish to see railways built, but not to see their building materialize the motives of certain 
Powers of whom China had grounds for suspicion.”45 Thus, Sichuan objected to foreign 
loans because of the power they gave foreign nations within China and the corruption that 
it represented among the Qing court.  
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The Struggles for Railway Capital 
 
 It was for this very reason that Xiliang had endeavored to construct a provincial 
railway. Two years after his 1905 memorial to the Emperor, local elites in Sichuan and 
Hubei met together in an effort to gather funds for the building of the new railway. There, 
they raised an initial $600,000 in Mexican silver.46 Mongton Hsu notes that later, “at a 
meeting of shareholders held in November, 1909, the accounts submitted showed that a 
sum of Tls. 15,405,902 had been collected in shares.”47 This dramatic raising of capital 
separated Sichuan from every other provincial railway project except its sister railway, 
the Canton-Hankou line.  
 Other local provincial railway companies also had difficulties in securing enough 
funding. For example, remittances from Chinese immigrants in America financed the 
Sunning Railway. As a great many of these immigrants were from Taishan, Guangdong, 
these donations reflected provincial pride in building a local railway. After securing 4.8 
million dollars in contributions, it still required 14 years to build a line extending only 85 
miles.48  Another company building a short line connecting Nanchang to Jiujiang in 
Jiangxi province was only able to complete half of its 87-mile length with local bank 
loans before requiring additional funds secured from a Japanese syndicate.49 The Fujian 
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railway line used a mixed approach by raising funds from both overseas Chinese and 
local merchants. They raised “shares” by pledging provincial taxes upon salt and grain as 
security. A mere year after construction the financially depleted enterprise had to borrow 
more money.50  
 Only the largest of the local railway enterprises, the Canton-Hankou Railway, 
easily secured sufficient funds. It gathered 44 million taels by selling subscriptions for a 
mere one tael each. The North-China Herald reported, “Not only are the monied [sic] 
classes rushing to buy shares, but the poorest of the poor and even those who are 
supposed of no cash to spare and hardly enough to keep body and soul together are 
buying up one or more shares.”51  Despite this initially successful beginning, 
mismanagement plagued the company and by 1911 not one rail had been laid in its 
construction. 
 Sichuan students abroad in other countries, upon noting the difficulties Xiliang 
also had in securing funds, proposed three methods in raising revenue. The first two 
methods were to “impose a tax on opium, salt, tea, and wine merchants...[and]...gather 
funds from various levels of copper coin bureaus throughout Sichuan and from local 
yamens.” The third way that they proposed was using the previously discussed system of 
taxation - zugu, which was a surcharge on grain output.52 The students studying abroad in 
Japan went beyond just suggesting proposals to raise capital. Although many were living 
in poor conditions, these overseas students among themselves had collected around sixty 
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thousand taels.53 While this was small percentage of the total needed for the railway, the 
students understood that if the capital raised for the Chuan-Han Railway was insufficient, 
then “it would surely be lost to foreign bankers.”54 
 The efforts of these students in trying to shore up the self-strengthening 
movement would become a powerful force in the waning days of the Qing. They 
provided leadership in Sichuan politics, becoming the voice of a newly awakened 
citizenry. The lower classes, vested by the ubiquitous tax burden, began to pay more 
attention to what was occurring in local and national politics. People from every level of 
society were beginning to interact in a newly formed public sphere that provided 
discourse over the problems inherent in the provincial system as well as the situation over 
the railroad. While many authors, such as Rankin and Rowe, have described the creation 
of this public sphere in the Jiangnan region, Zheng Xiaowei’s dissertation remains the 
most in-depth study of this process in Sichuan. 
 As a province-wide dialogue about the railway was emerging, the central 
government was already taking steps to close one of the three sources for Sichuan’s 
railway capital – the eradication of opium.  Sichuan had been “by far the largest producer 
and consumer of domestic opium in China by the turn of the twentieth century. In 1906, 
Sichuan produced 40 percent of China's opium.”55 The initial attempts at eradication 
stemmed mainly from the community of foreign missionaries. In a national survey, 
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“respondents reported that support came from the upper classes, who recognized that 
opium suppression was for the public good, and from the merchants and farmers, who 
saw it as a means of national reform."56 For many missionaries, the lack of success in 
finding converts could be mitigated by efforts to clean up what was considered a 
pernicious habit. As one missionary wrote, “With the success of the anti-opium crusade in 
China, the missionaries could point to at least one area where years of work had paid 
off.”57 
 The opinion within Sichuan, however, did not reflect the national sentiment. 
Local elites as well as the common man were not in favor of the eradication movement. 
Their focus was on the success of the provincial railway movement and taxation on 
opium production as means to achieve this goal.  Despite Sichuan's attitude toward 
eradication, the movement gained strength when the Qing government embraced the 
cause. The Emperor issued an edict in 1906 calling for the eradication of opium within 
ten years. This edict called for the closure of opium dens, the prohibition of smoking 
among officials, the end of the importation of opium and opiate byproducts by foreign 
powers, the limitation of opium planting until its cessation and the issuing of special 
licenses for opium smoking.58 With the selection of Zhao Erxun (1844–1927) as 
Governor-general of Sichuan from 1908-1911, the anti-opium movement in the province 
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led by missionaries became further allied with the provincial government. The stringent 
program he enacted achieved phenomenal success with an almost total eradication of 
poppy production in Sichuan province by 1910.59 The North-China Herald noted the 
unintended effect that this had on the railway effort by stating that although this tax was a 
significant portion of the railway fund at the early stages of gathering funds, by 1908 the 
eradication program meant that no taxes were available from opium.  This placed a 
greater burden on the forced contributions gained from zugu land taxes as well as private 
donations to the railway fund.60   
 As big a blow as the loss of opium represented, corruption was a more serious 
problem for Sichuan’s railway construction. It would signal the death of the railway 
project as it gave the central government reason for the seizure. The plague of corruption 
was not limited only to Sichuan, but pervaded the entire nation. As we have already seen, 
national leaders were susceptible to bribes and local leadership imitated them. Worse, 
corruption was an endemic part of the very bones of the imperial system. The next 
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Corruption and the Fight to Curtail It 
 
 In 1910, the North China Herald procured a report on the capital collected for the 
Chuan-Han Railway. They reported that after six years of soliciting funds and levying 
taxes, the total amount collected was 15 million taels. The paper reported, however, that 
work on the construction of the railway had not even begun, yet the fund had already 
expended one-third of the collected amount. The paper reports, “It is to be remembered 
that the expenditure covers a period when no work was being done on the proposed line, 
and when the only legitimate outlay would have been a few thousand taels for a 
preliminary survey.”61 The majority of this waste was through corruption from 
government and railway officials.  
 Corruption was not a factor unique to Sichuan as it had spread to every Qing 
governmental layer on both the provincial and national level. In Sichuan's case, the Qing 
political infrastructure, which encouraged corruption, remained the primary cause for the 
mismanagement of funds. First, the Qing bureaucracy “remained extremely stable in 
numbers throughout most of the dynasty.  Population numbers exploded, however, 
leading to an exponential increase of the ratio of the public per official.”62 Local officials 
were simply too overworked to oversee the system efficiently. Second, local 
administrative units under the Qing remained vastly underfunded. Madeleine Zelin, in her 
work on Qing administration, notes that local units were starved for funds. Even though 
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these local units collected revenue from taxes, the largest portion was sent to the central 
government.63 
 Officials were left to collect funds from the populace, usually in the form of fees 
for governmental services. Many of these fees included outright extortion.64 Paul H. 
Hickey, in his work on these fees in late Qing China, writes:  
The inadequacy of salaries for government officials was one of the defining 
characteristics of the bureaucratic system of late imperial times. Because 
salaries failed to cover the real costs of obtaining and holding office, officials, 
as a matter of course, resorted to collecting fees (guifei or lougui) from their 
subordinates or the people in their jurisdiction.65 
 
These administration difficulties were not limited to the upper administration by any 
means, as local clerks were even more rapacious than the higher level bosses.  While 
magistrates and other high officials rotated to different provinces, the locally recruited 
clerks were very difficult to remove from office. These clerks had families, relatives, and 
friends who had lived in the same locality generation after generation. Their personal 
interests in matters concerning their relatives and friends inevitably led to favoritism and 
irregularities in taxation, labor service, and lawsuits.66 The magistrate, in contrast, had no 
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personal relations with the local people except possibly with some members of the 
gentry.67  
  H.B. Morse, an American who had intimate knowledge of the Chinese 
governmental structure during his service in the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs 
Service from 1874-1908, wrote that "it is a matter of common knowledge that the income 
of the Chinese official is not any degree measured by his official salary, that the annual 
profit of his office may be Tls. 100,000, with an official salary not exceeding Tls. 1,000.” 
This system easily allowed for the creation of an official that “exists solely for his own 
maintenance and that of his fellow-officials, his superiors and subordinates."68 In 
Sichuan, this same atmosphere fostered corruption, no doubt aided by the massive 
amounts of money collected from donations, opium, and the zugu. According to a poster 
quoted by Zheng Xiaowei, “the majority was appropriated and wasted by the official 
elites in the Chuan-Han Railway Company: for example, more than 3,000 taels were 
utilized just for one entertainment banquet by the officials.” Entertainment was not the 
only reason for the mismanagement of the railroad funds. Other bureaus of the 
government used railroad capital to help start up their own activities. Pu Dianjun, student 
leader and future revolutionary, led the fight to educate the public that two million taels 
of the estimated five million gathered in 1906 had been appropriated by the Copper 
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Bureau. This was despite the fact that the Copper Bureau was entirely new and was at the 
time unable to produce any copper.69  
In the previously mentioned 1910 report, the North China Herald laid out an in-
depth exposé of these expenditures looking into how the mismanaged funds were 
allocated. One-third of the amount was paid out as interest, which the writer commented 
was an interesting fact for a people “alleged to be so anxious to prevent the construction 
of the line by foreign capital.” More than 250,000 taels were labeled “miscellaneous” 
with an equal amount spent on students, something noted as strange in railway accounts. 
The newspaper also noted that “a large staff of engineers has been maintained, although 
there can be little to show for their salaries.” China's most famous railroad engineer, Zhan 
Tianyou, was rumored to be receiving pay as well. However, the Herald states, “It would 
be interesting to learn how much time China's most prominent engineer has given to the 
line, or whether he has even been able to visit the province of Szechuan.”70 For the writer 
of the Herald, the expenditure of 86,820 taels on printing seemed to be the most flagrant 
example of mismanagement. He wrote that “such a sum, it might be said in picturesque 
language, would almost suffice to cover the whole province with the printed page.”71 
 There were efforts to clean up this situation. The foreign students, in particular, 
clamored for fact-finding missions that brought to light the corruption of the Railway 
Company. Their solution to mismanagement was to open the management beyond just 
government officials, intending to bring transparency by allowing greater oversight of the 
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company and at the same time increasing public support. If this was not done, they 
argued the railway would be susceptible to foreign takeover through the implementation 
of a railway loan. In February 1907, Governor-general Xiliang transferred the railway 
from an officially provincial-owned company to one that was supervised by the officials 
and managed by merchants. They formed a board of councilors, with every county 
represented by “a gentry member in the council on the grounds that the county had 
contributed funds to the project.”72  
 The students and local gentry led by Pu Dianjun continued pressure on Xiliang 
until he allowed the Chuan-Han Railway Company in March 1907 to become 
“commercially managed, with the shareholders having ultimate power.”73 This meant that 
“all provincial officials were withdrawn from the company and the company's 
management was thus transferred to the control of local gentry leaders.” The zugu 
system, however, continued to remain a centerpiece of this new company.74 Shareholders 
were now created in two ways. Private donors were shareholders with both “rights 
(quanli) and responsibilities (yiwu) as shareholders,” including a right to a five percent 
dividend for investing. The second concept of shareholding was through the zugu. These 
taxes to the railway companies were stock held in common by the prefectures and 
counties, with dividends recycled back into the system.75 Although this system was 
certainly not democratic in the most popular sense, it still retained considerable power at 
the local level. In contrast, appointed officials on the Canton-Hankou line managed the 
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railway for its entire lifespan, with the shareholders having no say in the provincial 
company.76  
 As evidence of their new power, the student association in Japan in 1908 laid 
embezzlement charges against the Daotai of Chengdu, Chen Binguan.77 In his official 
capacity, he would have been in charge of the railway company and considered the center 
of corruption. In the middle of the investigation, however, the government ordered the 
official inquiry closed, ruling that no embezzlement occurred and charges against the 
directors (whom Chen represented in this case) were nonexistent. The North-China 
Herald noted that the government's opinion of the accusation over the “Tls. 3,000 spent 
on feasting and merry-making, was simply calumny."78  
 Despite reform and investigations into corruption, public confidence was 
shattered. Purchased shares, which was a real indicator of public support, “declined from 
Tls. 2,535,697 in the first year to Tls. 136,890 in the 2nd and finally Tls. 87,863 in the 
3rd year.” By 1910, it had practically ceased and with the closure of the opium tax due to 
opium eradication enforcement, the funding for the railway relied solely on the income 
from the zugu land tax. One official noted that in his opinion “they would never build the 
line and that in three years or five at the most the last step would have been taken when 
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the aid of foreigners would have to be requisitioned.”79 Adding to this pessimism, railway 
funds endured a coup d’état with the collapse of several banks during the Shanghai 
rubber speculation bubble of 1910. It was enough to finish off what was left of the funds 
after the corruption scandals.80  The belief existed among some, of course, that the money 
was actually embezzled by the manager of the railway company.81  
 
Railway Nationalization and Response 
 
All of these issues would come to a head with the issuing of the imperial 
memorial. The zugu, as onerous as it had been, was the central feature of the railway 
fund. Despite the protestations of Sichuan leaders and the wide disapproval the program 
faced within the province, eradication almost completely eliminated opium. Corruption, a 
feature of the Qing local government rather than just a mere symptom, not only ate away 
the amount already raised but also cut into the funds raised by other departments. In 
addition, it destroyed donations which, although not a large percentage of the whole, 
represented the true confidence in the strength of the railway project. Each of these 
represented government interference into local affairs, creating anger directed at the 
central government. 
 The final straw for Sichuan was rumors of corruption tainting the railway seizure 
itself. Sheng Xuanhuai, national Minister of Posts and Communications as well as 
Director-General of Mines and Railroads, was widely condemned as the author of this 
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nationwide action. In attempting to pacify the outraged response that erupted from the 
seizure, the government had “proposed to exchange its railway shares for interest-earning 
government bonds, for the people in Hubei and Hunan provinces. For the Sichuanese, 
however, it offered to redeem the sums spent solely for railway purposes rather than the 
sums subscribed.”82 Although progress in the construction of the Sichuan-Hankou line 
remained limited, in contrast the Canton-Hankou line had squandered greater amounts of 
money with no results toward construction. As previously mentioned, that line had used 
the sale of stock as a primary source of funding while government officials retained 
power over the railway company. In contrast, Sichuan stockholders aided the new railway 
management, now lead by returned students, in efforts to end corruption. Perhaps worst 
of all, Sheng Xuanhuai, the minister who proposed this new plan, had invested 
“significantly in bonds in Hubei and Hunan provinces but none in Sichuan province. The 
outraged Sichuanese groups protested that the government intended to sell Sichuan to the 
foreigners.”83 
Sheng Xuanhuai already had a reputation of being a “sell out” since 1905, when 
he negotiated a foreign loan for a railroad in his native Jiangsu. Provincial officials had 
petitioned the Court to have Sheng removed from office for negotiating a much larger 
sum than necessary for a short, local railway.84 He survived this and continued at his post. 
Despite Sheng's reputation, S.C. Yang naïvely argued that he really wanted to redeem the 
shareholders of the Chuan-Han railway as well as the shareholders in Hubei and Hunan, 
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but that the Imperial Court decided otherwise.85 As head of the Railway Bureau and the 
one who suggested the railway nationalization program, Sheng Xuanhuai fulfilled both of 
Tara Sethia definitions of collaborator. This situation reinforces Wang Ching-Chun's 
statement that the belief that corruption existed outweighed any truth that corruption 
occurred. 
 The national government, under pressure from foreign powers, caved to demands 
to nationalize the railway. While corruption at the provincial level undermined efforts at 
the railway effort, corruption at the national level on the railway issue proved to be the 
last instance in a long history of the Qing's inability to maintain its sovereignty against 
foreign intrusion. In addition, by refusing to refund the revenue already spent while at the 
same time recognizing what a burden it had been on the people, the Qing government 
showed how unimportant provincial concerns figured into making policy that affected the 
province. Even worse, it seemed that there was no peaceful method for redress with the 
highest authority arrayed against local interests. 
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THE CREATION OF A UNIFIED POLITICAL MOVEMENT 
 
 The issue of national sovereignty (guoquan) was of equal importance to the 
Sichuan people as that of economic rights. In her study of the Recovery Movement’s 
propaganda, Zheng Xiaowei writes that the intent of the rhetoric was to “defend the rights 
of the people (minquan) and to stand up for the sovereignty of the nation (guoquan).”86 
The anger at foreign intrusion over the railway became bound up with anger against the 
Qing state’s inability to deal with them. Although this was not a new occurrence, racial 
undertones became more prevalent after the weakness displayed during the Taiping 
Rebellion. For example, in 1903 Zou Rong, a former Sichuanese student in Japan, 
harangued the Manchus for 260 years of oppression, sorrow, cruelty, and tyranny and 
called for their extermination. This would come about by turning the sons and grandsons 
of the Yellow Emperor into [George] Washingtons.87 A writer commenting on the similar 
protest in Jiangsu and Zhejiang summed it up succinctly when he stated, “The Chinese, 
who were already slaves of the Manchus, would become slaves of slaves as the Qing 
became subservient to foreigners.”88
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 This growth in the idea of political rights were not just a Sichuan phenomenon but 
was the result of a national debate on state responsibility and the new citizen. This debate 
was led primarily by Liang Qichao (1873-1929). Newspapers, either published 
clandestinely in Shanghai or carried in from abroad, carried his rhetoric throughout 
China. Liang, a follower of Kang Youwei (1858-1927) in the constitutional monarchy 
movement as well as the 1898 Hundred Days’ Reform,89 fled abroad after it was defeated 
and settled in Japan. In 1902, Liang set up the Xinmin Congbao, or New Citizen. Li 
Jieren, commenting in his novel Baofengyu qian [After the Storm], wrote that the two 
most important newspapers in Sichuan were Liang Qichao's New Citizen and the Minbao 
(People's News), which was the political organ of Sun Yatsen's Tongmenghui, or Chinese 
Revolutionary Alliance.90 In addition to these papers, there was also a circulation of the 
Shibao (Eastern Times), Zhongwai Ribao (Sino-Foreign Daily), Shenzhou Ribao (China 
Daily), and other regional papers.91  
The views that formed the core of Liang Qichao's editorials were ideas of 
citizenship based on Western liberalism. In the Xinmin Congbao, “he advocated the ideas 
of free thinking and equality of all citizens by introducing Rousseau's theory of 'social 
contract' and Montesquieu's ideas of the division of power to a Chinese readership.”92 He 
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wrote in one of his essays about the nature of this new citizenry and its relationship to the 
nation: 
The citizenry is an assemblage of individual persons. The rights of the state 
are composed of the rights of individuals. Therefore, the thoughts, feelings, 
and actions of a citizenry will never be obtainable without the thoughts, 
feelings, and actions of each individual member. That the people is strong 
means that the state is strong; that the people is weak means that the state is 
weak; that the people is rich means that the state is rich; that the people is poor 
means that the state is poor; that the people possess rights means that the state 
possesses rights; and that the people is without shame means that the state is 
without shame.93  
 
The concept of a rich people forming a rich state harkens back to Li Jieren's commentary 
on the anger of the national railway seizure. For the people of Sichuan, money for the 
railway for which they had sweated and bled was the uniting factor among every level of 
society. The state, in the supposed name of self-strengthening, had seized a private 
concern with intentions, in the minds of the people, of delivering it into the hands of 
foreign powers. It did not matter that the railway company was bankrupt and that 
provincial resources alone were insufficient to build the railway. They saw the railway 
seizure not just as a loss of their economic rights and their future, but as a final failure of 
the Qing political order. 
Liang Qichao's writings in the 1900s promoted this very concept that 
“sovereignty lies with the people.” This notion was disseminated to the Sichuan elite in 
important pamphlets and writings and numerous newspapers.94 From there it was 
distributed throughout the province. The shared language of the Recovery Movement was 
of a common struggle, which comes through when Mary Rankin comments that “despite 
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the provincial settings of the rights-recovery movements, the participants had a holistic 
vision of a unified China. The terms compatriots (tongbao) or comrades (tongzhi) 
conjured up ideals of solidarity and common identity.”95 
Despite this egalitarian strain, Zheng Xiaowei notes that this movement within 
Sichuan was a creation of elite, nationalistic leaders. She wrote, “Notably, not all 
Sichuanese were against the foreign loan or the nationalization policy; on the contrary, it 
was only a faction….Yet, this small faction exerted great energy and launched an 
enormously successful campaign.”96 Zheng Xiaowei does not, however, address the 
process by which these elites came together or how they merged with the lower classes 
into a unified movement. This section will look into the creation of local leadership by 
focusing on two divergent processes. The first process is through the new reforms 
introduced by both national leaders and Sichuan viceroys that sent students abroad to 
learn Western techniques as part of the self-strengthening movement. The second process 
is the effort by local elites to negate Western intrusion through the use of secret societies. 
Evidence will show that both of these process stemmed from government policies, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally. They became the mechanisms for resistance to 
central government authority when the state refused to acknowledge local concerns over 
the railway seizure issue. 
 
Elite Activism, Students, and the Provincial Assembly 
 
 In the rest of China, local elites were a product of a transforming Chinese society. 
The Taiping Rebellion had devastated the Jiangnan region of China. The local elites in 
                                                 
95 Mary B. Rankin. “Nationalistic Contestation and Mobilization Politics,” 340. 




these regions had experienced the contractions of the Qing dynasty’s practical 
sovereignty and social control. Local elites had to step in to fulfill the roles that had 
traditionally been the purview of government officials. Even during the Taiping 
Rebellion, the government found that its reliance on limited numbers of Manchu and 
Chinese Bannermen proved unsuccessful in stemming the tide of rebel victories. The 
Court called on a local Hunanese scholar, Zeng Guofan, who worked with and expanded 
local militia organizations (called tuanlian) in his home area.97 His radical new approach 
of linking fortified villages and raising an independent militia able to contend with 
Taiping forces was particularly effective. This ad-hoc force defeated the Taipings, further 
undercutting the legitimacy of the Qing. 
 In addition to their military activities, elites expanded their influence by joining 
new projects in their home areas. Elites in collusion with local government 
“enthusiastically participated in reforms that expanded their influence over ordinary 
people and built their social reputation.”98 In his work on the city of Hankou, William 
Rowe explains this phenomenon: “The nineteenth century, in Hankou as throughout 
urban China, was a period of profound innovation and dramatic expansion of collective 
action in the provision of social services.” These services were almost entirely 
homegrown and in their development “the bureaucratic administration played a real but 
decidedly secondary role in the process.”99 This included a real role in disaster relief, the 
maintenance of granaries, and the establishment of benevolence halls. 
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 Mary Rankin, in her work on elite activism in the Jiangnan region, states that 
many scholars previously “assumed that an autonomous public sector did not develop in 
China until the end of the nineteenth century and this development involved the 
importation of Western institutions.” As Chinese elites implemented Western institutions 
as early as midcentury, the rebuilding from the Taiping Rebellion had already spread out 
managerial responsibilities among a greater number of elites. This led to a “growth of 
independently financed institutional complexes, the rise of managerial activism, and the 
development of rationales justifying autonomous initiative to benefit one's home area and 
recreate community solidarity in a perilous age.” Rankin notes the impact that this had on 
the stability of elite dominance in that “the very success of local reconstruction 
contributed to the proliferation of social organization beyond government control–
ultimately undermining the political system the elites still sought to preserve.”100 Thus, 
Western style reforms were added to a foundation already in place, instead of working as 
a catalyst for elite involvement. 
 In Sichuan, the situation was opposite as the province developed in isolation and 
escaped the devastation of the Taiping Rebellion. There, government and society 
coexisted symbiotically. In discussing the dual nature of Sichuan's government, S.A.M. 
Adshead wrote: 
One the one hand, there was a formal hierarchy: governor-general, top 
provincial officials, daotais, prefects, local magistrates, military commanders; 
all non-Sichuanese, all designed by Beijing or by people themselves appointed 
by Beijing; a hierarchy which held a monopoly of legal authority. On the other 
hand, there was the informal hierarchy: a group of local notables, a provincial 
establishment; mainly but not wholly Sichuanese, mainly but not wholly 
resident in the province; a hierarchy with few legally defined rights but 
considerable extra-legal powers. Sichuan government was a mixture of 
collaboration, conflict and compromise between the two elements. Both 
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elements were weak in absolute terms: in their degree of organization and in 
the amount of money and men they controlled. However weak it might be in 
absolute terms, its resources were concentrated, nucleated so to speak, in the 
governor-general, while those of the informal hierarchy were not only 
diffused, atomized among the individual members of the provincial ruling 
class, but also fundamentally dependent on the imperial system of which the 
governor-general was representative. It was a situation of court with country, 
bureaucratic power without countervailing social power.101 
 
It was the creation of provincial institutions, mainly by governor-generals, that 
crafted a politically awakened elite class. These included reforms under Xiliang, 
who first argued for the railway and in particular for sending students abroad, and 
the creation of the provincial assembly under Governor-general Zhao Erxun. 
 Xiliang, during his time in Sichuan, was very instrumental in enacting reforms. 
He initialized the reformation of the military–dismissing corrupt and incompetent officers 
as well as training new troops. He did not ignore commercial activities or agricultural 
improvements, either. He promoted new methods of agriculture and set up a buffer zone 
of colonists to spare the Sichuan heartland from incursions by non-Han peoples on the 
border. He was also involved in the parallel Rights Recovery Movement to protect 
Sichuan's mines from foreign domination. He instituted education reforms and founded 
newspapers and magazines, so that the concepts of reform could be spread among the 
populace.102 It was in the area of education, particularly sending students abroad, that 
Xiliang would have the most impact. He recognized that dependency on “foreign experts 
and foreign-bought equipment ultimately relegate the Chinese to the position of followers 
who are seldom seen running their own factories. While this may have been excused in 
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the past, today we must push ahead without delay.”103 With this in mind, Xiliang sent 
several students to the West and Japan to learn modern techniques, especially in industrial 
related fields. 
 This educational reform was definitely not unique to Sichuan. The first concerted 
effort to send students abroad was led by Zeng Guofan, the victor over the Taipings. He 
understood the problem of merely adopting Western technology without understanding it. 
He wrote about restructuring the educational system for this reason, addressing the 
superiority of the Western model when he wrote: 
Whether they [Westerners] be scholars, artisans, or soldiers, they all go to 
school to study and understand the principles, to practice on the machines, and 
to participate in the work. They all exert themselves to the utmost of their 
ingenuity, and learn from one another, in the hope that there will be monthly 
progress and yearly improvement. If we Chinese wish to adopt their superior 
techniques and suddenly try to buy all their machines, not only will our 
resources be insufficient to do so, but we will be unable to master the 
fundamental principles or to understand the complicated details of the 
techniques, unless we have actually seen and practiced with them for a long 
time.104 
 
When these students returned from abroad, they were not immediately accepted and had 
to prove their abilities.105 When their contributions became recognized, the Qing 
government set up a system that rewarded high level official ranks to returning students. 
Dong Shaohui, in his article on students studying abroad, articulates this new method of 
professional success when he writes: 
For well over a thousand years, the sole ladder of success for most young 
students was to take the civil service examination and become an official (keju 
zuoguan). Now, just as the old style keju system was dying its natural death, 
the Qing government opened up a new pathway to success: study abroad to 
become an official (liuxue zuoguan). This provided great enticements, not just 
                                                 
103 Xiliang yigao (zougao) [The posthumous manuscripts and draft memorials of Xiliang], 
Vol. 1, 404. Quoted in Yimen He, 144. 
104 Guofan Zeng, “On Sending Young Men to Study Abroad.” Quoted in de Bary, 241. 
105 Douglas R. Reynolds, China, 1895-1912: State Sponsored Reforms and China's Late 




in terms of encouraging young students to go abroad but in absorbing them 
after their return.106 
 
By the time of the 1911 Revolution, many officials at both a national and provincial 
level originated as returned students. Thus, the student reformers in Sichuan had a 
foundation of political activity inspired by widespread allegiance to Liang Qichao’s 
concept of a different relationship between crown and subject. 
 The advancement of this new political relationship, as intended by Liang, was 
intended to occur through the emergence of provincial assemblies. In 1909, the 
government held elections in all twenty-one provinces to form these assemblies. William 
Rowe writes that "despite stringent educational and property-holding requirements that 
narrowed the (all-male) electorate to less than 0.5 percent of the population, an estimated 
two million Qing subjects went to the polls and got a taste of political participation 
undreamt of up to that time."107  Despite the selection of mostly gentry with national or 
provincial level degrees, the majority of the assemblymen in each province were in the 
reformer camp.108 Throughout the nation, these provincial assemblies were "forging 
lateral ties of solidarity and group unity, and there emerged a rivalry between them and 
the provincial governors, the local officials.”109 
 In Sichuan, the situation was particularly acrimonious. Pu Dianjun, the student 
activist leader, became the first elected assembly president. This shows the power of the 
student movement in Sichuan. In other provinces, the presidents elected were men of 
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learning or held economic status in the community. In Jonathan Spence's discussion of 
the expertise of assembly presidents, he noted that those of Guangdong, Hunan, and 
Zhejiang were holders of the jinshi degree and thus were products of the traditional civil 
service system.110  In addition, Pu Dianjun was a mere thirty-four years old at this time 
when the age of provincial assembly presidents averaged at forty-one.111 As previously 
discussed, his age did not deter him from butting heads with Xiliang as student leader 
over the governance of the railway company or leading the fight against corruption by 
local officials. Lancelot Lawton, a British journalist, notes that Pu kept up the pressure 
after his election on these same issues. He wrote: 
As time passed, the Assembly, which was extremely popular throughout the 
province, adopted an almost aggressive attitude toward the authorities. It 
condemned in no small measured terms the corruption of the local officials, 
demanded to have a voice in the matter of financial control, and endeavored to 
bring about a reduction in the salaries paid to the Viceroy and his immediate 
subordinates.112 
 
This came about despite Zhao Erxun's effort to check the power of the assembly by 
narrowly confining it to the ‘power of petition’ and warning it that the principal goal 
of the assembly should be the continued dominance of the Qing court.113   
 The irony of Sichuan was that the main instigator of reforms there, Xiliang, 
was a Manchu loyalist to the Empire. His railway proposal, intended to strengthen 
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the state in one of its remotest provinces, became the reason for tension between 
capital and province. His educational reforms allowed the formation of a political 
leadership made up of former students sent abroad. They, in turn, helped push for the 
new provincial assemblies that would contribute in overthrowing the dynasty. The 
journalist Lancelot Lawton provided an excellent summary of these events leading 
to 1911 when he wrote: 
From Sichuan, as from the rest of China, young men were chosen to be sent 
abroad to the universities of Japan and of the West, who, with their return, did 
not hesitate to preach the doctrine of individual and constitutional liberty. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the inauguration of Provincial Assemblies in 
1910 found among the Sichuanese a newly awakened public opinion, a public 
opinion determined and candid in its condemnation of past misrule, and fierce 
in its hatred of the Manchu oligarchy. In a people who, by the very nature of 
their geographical isolation, had inherited a spirit of sturdy independence, the 
factors I have enumerated tended to mold a strong, if somewhat bigoted, 
patriotism. With the spread of education had come with it for the first time the 
knowledge of China's foreign intercourse, a history which was interpreted as 
nothing but a sinister plot on the part of the Great Powers to rob China of her 
territories. Consequently, on the inauguration of a Provincial Assembly, more 
or less representative of public opinion, side by side with the demand for 
popular liberties went up the insistent cry of “China for the Chinese.”114 
 
 
The Gelaohui: Mixing Elite and Commoner in Secret 
 
 With elites forming the top leadership of the Rights Recovery Movement, 
they still needed the strength of the common people, either for protest participation 
or revolt. Sichuan's potential military assets were also remarkably different from that 
of the Jiangnan region or the other eastern provinces. S.A.M. Adshead describes the 
situation thus: 
Although tuanlian militia units were raised in the Jiaqing period against the 
White Lotus Rebellion and in the Xianfeng period against the Taipings, no 
major gentry army such as those of Hunan or Anhui were based in Sichuan. 
Guandu shangban (official supervision and merchant operation) industry, 
which raised the level of social organization in Jiangsu and Zhili, was slow to 
reach Sichuan, and the province never had the powerful clan networks of 
                                                 




Fujian and Guangdong. Between the family or partnership and the state, there 
was only the secret society: the Guolaohui (Elder Brother Society), the mafia 
of the teahouses and market towns, whose development in the second half of 
the nineteenth century was only a surrogate for the social growth of other 
provinces.115  
 
The Gelaohui in general were an anti-Manchu secret society that dedicated itself to the 
overthrow of the Qing Court and Han resurgence. In Sichuan, the main branch of the 
Gelaohui was the Paoge, or Gowned Brotherhood. The extent of the Paoge in Sichuan 
was very widespread, with elements in almost every town although their power base was 
centered in the southwest and northeast of the province.116 The Paoge became so 
powerful that one local chronicler in Longshuizhen bluntly noted that in that town, power 
was “ranked one for shen; two for liang; and three for Paoge.”117 
 The Taiping Rebellion facilitated the spread of the Gelaohui in Sichuan and other 
provinces.118 Members had joined the Hunan Army for the suppression of the Taipings, 
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even though the inclusion of secret societies was strictly forbidden by its leader, Zeng 
Guofan. With the Taipings defeated, these armies disbanded and Gelaohui members were 
spread out across the country. Men who no longer had a desire to farm banded together to 
form groups of sworn brothers, vagrants, and thieves. On assessing the early leadership of 
the society in the days after the Taiping, it was found that at one point almost all of them 
had been in the army.119 
 With the Paoge steadily gaining power, it became obvious that even the social 
elites had to join to maintain their influence. Wang Di notes that “the Gelaohui had no 
lack of gentry or landlords.”120  This mixing was facilitated by the ubiquity of the Paoge 
in Sichuan’s famed teahouses, which the secret society used for its headquarters.121 Wang 
Di notes that every level of male society entered the Sichuan teahouse, from elites to 
peddlers. It was a place to conduct business, hold meetings for the Paoge and other 
associations, and simply socialize.122 While a complete knowledge of Paoge numbers is 
nearly impossible, there can be no doubt that it pervaded all levels of Sichuan society. As 
a popular Sichuanese saying at this time hinted, “The Ming lacked illiterates; the Qing 
lacked those who did not join the Paoge.”123 
 Local elites turned to the Gelaohui as an alternative power structure because of 
the threat they faced from foreign missionaries. Missionaries had long been seen as 
                                                                                                                                                 
secret society was directly tied to the Taiping Rebellion, causing “Gelaohui numbers to 
rapidly expand.” 
119 Shaoqing Cai, “On the Origins of the Gelaohui,” Modern China 10.4 (1984): 498-499. 
120 Di Wang, Kuachu fengbi de shijie: Changjiang shangyou quyu shehui yanjiu, 1644–
1911, 546.    
121 Di Wang, The Teahouse, 178-179. 
122 Ibid, 168-169. 
123 Shiliang Liu, Hanliu shi [History of Paoge], (Chengdu: Liu Shiliang yizuo chubanshe) 
[Chengdu: Posthumous work of Liu Shiliang Publishing House], 1949, 10. Quoted in 




agents of foreign powers, but especially so after the end of the Taiping Rebellion when 
they were no longer restricted to the coastal treaty ports. As further treaty ports opened up 
within China's interior, local elites stirred up the people based on the view that the 
missionaries were a vanguard for Western invasion.124 A look at Western actions at the 
time shows why the local elites may have had this opinion. A treaty in 1858 forced 
Hankou to open to foreign trade. Further up the Yangzi, Jingzhou opened in 1876 and 
Yichang in 1877. One term negotiated in the Unequal Treaties that opened these ports to 
Westerners was the right of missionaries to establish themselves there, further driving 
home the belief that missionary activity was merely a branch of foreign imperialism. 
Chongqing, the gateway to Sichuan, opened up as a treaty port in 1890. 
 Resistance to missionaries was consistent throughout much of the country. Daniel 
Bay, in summing up the contentious position of missionaries states, “The elite held 
economic, social, ideological, and political hegemony in local society, and the missionary 
presence was an affront to their dignity and a threat to their society.”125 The threat of 
missionaries was that they operated a separate power structure excluding local elites and 
abrogating traditional elite societal roles. The unequal treaties gave missionaries extra-
territorial privileges that made them exempt from Chinese law, yet provided “better 
access to the nearest government official than did the local elites” by way of their 
relationship with the foreign powers. When incidents against missionaries began to 
increase, “foreign diplomatic complaints and demands from these events eventually filled 
up many storage cabinets in the archives of the Zongli Yamen, the equivalent of the 
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foreign office of the dynasty.”126 Missionaries were thus able to gain access even to the 
imperial court through diplomatic pressure, bypassing the traditional hierarchical power 
structure than was the backbone of Chinese politics. 
 The Paoge resisted the efforts of the missionaries in what came to be known as 
jiao'an, or antimissionary incidents. The two largest pre-1911 antimissionary incidents, or 
jiao'an, were the Chongqing Anti-missionary Riots of 1886 and the Yu Dongchen 
uprising. The riots in Chongqing lasted from June to September 1886. Chinese attacks 
escalated, first against missionaries and foreign controlled interests and then spreading to 
converts. Judith Wyman states that the main reason for this incident may have been that 
eastern Sichuan had been experiencing a famine for the first part of the decade.127 While 
the rioters targeted both Christians and foreigners, the main purpose of the riots happened 
to be a Christian grain merchant who was known to be terribly callous. 
 Later, Yu Dongchen's Rebellion became the second major mass incident targeting 
missionaries. Wu Yangzhang, in his Recollections of the Revolution of 1911, wrote that 
Yu Dongchen was a peasant who abhorred injustice. When local Christian leaders seized 
some people with whom they were in dispute, Yu rebelled. Numerous local elites 
welcomed him as his rebellion spread from his home county of Dazu County in Sichuan 
to Hubei until he was eventually captured by Qing troops in 1898. In Wu Yuzhang's 
opinion, it was “the lack of correct ideological guidance” that allowed the leadership of 
the Gelaohui as well as Yu Dongchen to become corrupt. They became “alienated from 
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the peasant masses and handicraftsmen,” the lower classes which represented the origins 
of the Gelaohui.128  
 Whatever the reason for Yu's defeat, both his rebellion and the Chongqing riots 
emphasize the dissolving relationship between Sichuan elites and the Qing government 
prior to 1911. Both incidents and an equally costly riot in Chengdu in 1895 were put 
down with the help of government troops, showing that the foreign powers held complete 
sway over the Qing court in the minds of many of the provincial elite. The Chongqing 
Riot cost the province 230,000 taels.129 The Sichuan government levied 943,597 taels for 
the Chengdu Riot and more than 1 million for the Yu Dongchen uprising.130 This was a 
staggering total for a province whose entire tax figure for 1900 was 8,722,937.131 The 
Chongqing Riot was particularly notable in this aspect as “much to the consternation both 
of the Chinese and French officials, Bishop Coupat [of Chongqing] succeeded in 
obtaining indemnity payments specifically allocated for nearly two thousand Chinese 
Christians left homeless.”132 The Chinese had argued that the converts were Chinese and 
did not fall under the indemnity agreement for the loss of foreign property and loss of 
life. The French ministers in both Hankou and Beijing agreed with the Qing court. 
Coupat, however, secured payment through careful negotiation.133 This showed the power 
that the missionaries and Christian churches were capable of without the direct 
intervention of their usual protectors, the Western diplomatic corps. 
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 By 1904, however, Sichuan had experienced more jiao'an than any other province 
in the empire. Judith Wyman writes that “over one hundred major and many more minor 
attacks had been launched against Westerners and Chinese Christians in Sichuan, thirty in 
the Chongqing region.”134  While Sichuan experienced a frequency of such interactions 
between local secret societies and missionaries, other areas of the country shared similar 
experiences. While the Boxers were the most predominant in the Western imagination, 
the prevalence of secret societies in Chinese society was not limited to them or their 
homeland in China's northeast. The spread of antiforeign movements and sentiment was 
nation-wide, ironically facilitated by the spread of transportation. 
 Despite the number and frequency of the attacks, the Paoge seemed to realize that 
outright acts of mass violence were counterproductive. The Paoge began to take another 
approach as described by The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal. In their view, 
the Paoge now began to act against foreign missionaries by trying to infiltrate Christian 
churches and subvert them for their own gain. They began to play off the Roman 
Catholics against the Protestants and vice versa. For example, in Yuqihe in 1903, 
agitators threatening a Protestant congregation joined the Roman Catholic Church as a 
counterbalance. The Chinese Recorder wrote, “This time these leaders...[of the secret 
society]..., knowing that in the present attitude of the officials to the foreigner they 
couldn't carry out their plan as ordinary citizens, formed the plan of using the Roman 
Catholic Church as protection.”135 The tension created by minor acts of violence and 
religious subterfuge would last all the way to the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution.    
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 It was these minor acts that created many of the problems in the first place. 
Although the indemnities were economically devastating, the root of the problem was 
that Christians in Sichuan were not merely passive actors for anti-Christian activity. They 
themselves created many of the problems.136 As early as 1878, in a circular to China's 
ministers abroad, it was noted that one of the chief problems was “the arrogation of 
official status to themselves by some missionaries and their interference in local 
government, and the refusal of Chinese converts to abide by the laws of China.”137  
Converts were not shy in using foreign power to fulfill their demands or as an 
umbrella of protection in local disputes. For example, Christian converts in Fucheng in 
1908 refused to pay dues to their professional societies because of the use of idols in 
union religious functions. They refused alternative suggestions from community leaders 
such as using these dues for road repair or charitable donations, as these would not 
placate the guilds. Converts were satisfied only when the foreign missionaries were able 
to guarantee protection against the trade unions.138 At Wanxian in 1904, profiteers sought 
baptism in the local Protestant church to procure a “foreign” head for their scheme to 
collect bad debts using church influence. 139 At Shizuan Xian, Roman Catholics beat a 
local secret society leader to death. While reputed to be a bad man responsible for the 
burning of a chapel, the West China Missionary News states that the real reason was that 
the man married a Christian widow without the consent of the local Roman Catholic 
congregation. The paper wrote, “It is a dreadful act of lawlessness on the part of the R.Cs. 
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and they are defying the mandarin who seems powerless. It's a wonder there are not more 
riots than have already occurred.”140 
 The most egregious misuse of missionary power was that of converts using 
missionaries as powerful agents in lawsuits. Small percentages of believers used 
foreigners as bludgeons in lawsuits, allowing a small minority to gain a substantial 
amount of power in local communities. This had been a significant cause for anti-
Christian activity during the Boxer Rebellion in China's northeastern provinces in 
1900.141 Recognizing the dangers inherent in this practice, missionaries strove to limit 
their interaction with converts on legal issues. In Sichuan, missionary A.E. Evans wrote 
in 1907 that, “we have aimed at separating the Church from all private concerns, and trust 
have been as successful as most of our equally zealous fellow-workers.”142  
Despite of this intention, the power of the Paoge expanded under elite 
leadership. While the Gelaohui began to encapsulate every strata of society, Robert 
Felsing commented that class struggle within the Gelaohui was never a part of its 
purpose. Felsing argued that the Gelaohui exhibited two components, a lower class 
stratum capable of and inured to violence and an upper class level that was crafting a 
new rhetoric of nationalism based on retaining Chinese sovereignty against foreign 
encroachment. This is not to say that the concepts and attitudes that the Gelaohui 
embodied were strictly along class lines, as elites would come to exhibit violence 
and lower class members took up the cause of nationalism. While many of the lower 
class society members could not escape their criminal or antisocial beginnings, the 
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later introduction of nationalism and integration of social elites posed a threat to the 
Qing political order. Because of this blending, “the Gelaohui exposed tens of 
thousands of ordinary Chinese folk to the concepts of brotherhood and nationalism, 
and it rejected passivity and 'natural' subservience to authority.”143 
 
 
The Outbreak of Protest 
 
By creating provincial leadership and then ignoring them, the central government 
set the conditions for wide-spread protests over the railway issue. The government’s 
inability to deal with the foreign missionaries’ presence enflamed Anti-Qing fervor. Its 
efforts to maintain stability over the protestations and frustrations of local elites by 
providing the troops that put down jiao’an underscored who was important in this 
equation. The memorial to nationalize the railway provided the final insult and 
consolidated a pre-existing resistance to central authority. In fact, a contemporary British 
journalist wrote that the “Railway League was formed with the sole object of carrying out 
a systematic opposition to the policy of the Government.”144 This League was allied with 
and led by the provincial assembly, even supported by acting-Viceroy Wang Renwen 
(1863-1939).145 In fact, the principal organizer of the League was Pu Dianjun, the 
provincial assembly president. 
 Efforts by the League to negotiate with the Qing government received two blows 
from the Court. The first of these, discussed previously, was the memorial to the Emperor 
for returning the railway to provincial control. This was rejected completely. Worse, the 
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imperial edict included a strong rebuke of the provincial assembly and Wang Renwen. 
The edict stated:  
Former Decrees have been issued, clearly setting forth the cessation of the 
“capital per rental,” and instructing that safe means be devised for the 
undertaking; how could they be misconstrued for “levying contributions.” 
Such illogical expressions and arbitrary conclusions only make their own 
abuses glaringly apparent. The said Acting Viceroy, notwithstanding his being 
an eyewitness of all these abusive circumstances, is really culpable for having 
so recklessly memorialized us on their behalf. A severe Imperial reprimand is 
hereby ordered to be transmitted to him. He is again ordered to print and 
publish the Yellow Proclamation at once far and wide, and to advise and 
induce all in earnest terms from time to time.146 
 
The response from the Sichuanese people was equally acidic. One local journal, as  
 
quoted by Lancelot Lawton, wrote:  
 
Would it be brave to overcome and subdue the defenseless masses? We say the 
masses, because the Sichuan Provincial Assembly (as are all Provincial 
Assemblies) is composed of men duly chosen and elected by them. What it has 
deemed fit and necessary to request of the throne by means of a petition, must 
be deemed equally so by those whom it represents. The insinuations as to its 
intrigues, etc., are as mean and unjustifiable as other expressions in these 
Decrees are undignified. For a coercive measure may succeed for a while, but 
the heart of the people cannot by won in that way....The people, we fear, 
tremble and submit to whatsoever whim the Throne may indulge in, as they 
did in times going by, without a struggle.147  
 
 The second blow came during the same month as the edict, when the Emperor 
refused calls for an immediate national assembly on the grounds that “the people's 
knowledge was insufficient and that it would be necessary to experiment over a term of 
nine years and gradually evolve a constitution.” Students in Sichuan and elsewhere went 
on strike and denounced the central government. In the opinion of S.C. Yang, this 
provided a secondary catalyst for the protests as the current political system allowed no 
veto over the Emperor's decision on railways.148 
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 Despite the anger at the government and violent rhetoric throughout the province, 
Pu Dianjun, as elected president of the provincial assembly, along with his deputy, Luo 
Lun, tried to maintain order. They put out a notice “asking the people to limit their 
struggle to the question of railway rights, and not to oppose the government and 
especially not to stage revolts.”149 Another means to control the populace was through the 
use of traveling lecturers. They traveled throughout the province giving lectures 
explaining the movement's causes and intentions. There were limitations on their 
effectiveness, however, as local magistrates were required for preapproval and lectures 
could be curtailed “if riotous or provocative statements were uttered.”150  Despite this, 
Railway League branches were set up in every district in the province.151 
 In July, a shareholder's meeting tried to call on the central government to form a 
citizen's convention drawn from members throughout China. “Pressure could thus be 
applied to force government reforms and to check the unfettered use of power by 
individuals, dangerous to province and nation alike.”152 Although never implemented, the 
plan indicated the Movement's constitutionalist sentiments. By August, however, 
frustration ran high among the protestors with calls for a general boycott and strike, as 
the provincial assembly began to realize that calls for the return of the railway were not 
achieving much. This was not limited just to Chengdu either, as news began to spread out 
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into the countryside.153 Some reformers even called for the raising of a militia to secure 
the railway against both the government and foreigners.154 
 All of this created a crisis for the Qing government, as news that the people in 
Sichuan were protesting the nationalization plan forced the recall of Zhao Erfeng from 
the Tibetan border. Zhao Erfeng's return to Chengdu placed him in a tenuous situation. 
He had succeeded his brother, Zhao Erxun, in the spring of 1911 while remaining as the 
provincial military commander.155 Because Zhao Erfeng was rarely in Chengdu, a local 
scholar, the previously mentioned Ran Wenren, was delegated as deputy Governor-
general. The real commanding power in the province, however, remained with Zhao 
Erfeng despite his frequent absenteeism in Tibet.  When he arrived in Chengdu, Zhao 
tried to reach a middle ground, cautioning the protesters while memorializing the court 
for the return of the railway. The central government's response was to order Duanfang, 
having arrived in Hankou, to seize the railway equipment in Yichang. Zhao, in an effort 
to salvage the situation, “became angry and published large proclamations urging the 
people to stop the movement, otherwise, 'bad and good will be destroyed.'”156  
 On September 7, 1911, Zhao Erfeng requested by phone that the nine gentry 
leaders of the resistance meet at his yamen. These included Luo Lun, as president of the 
Sichuan student's association, and Pu Dianjun, as president of the provincial assembly. 
After accusing them of stirring up the populace with rebellion, Zhao ordered them 
arrested as an attempt to appear decisive. Students and other agitators rushed the yamen 
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office demanding their release until fired upon by the guards killing 26 people.157 In an 
effort to free the hostages, some of the remaining leadership still free contacted the 
Gelaohui for support.158 Gelaohui units began to converge on Chengdu in support of 
those who had formed in response to the massacre at the yamen office. Three days after 
the arrests, an estimated 100,000 Paoge arrived to besiege Chengdu.159 
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THE COLLAPSE OF THE QING IN SICHUAN 
 
Although the issues of economic rights and national sovereignty created the 
railway movement, its success was guaranteed by the government’s military policy. For 
the central government, Sichuan was strategic in that it was the gateway to Tibet. 
Dominance in Tibet was necessary because of British encroachment from India, and the 
Chinese did not want to give them a clear path to one of their richest provinces. As 
foreign imperialist pressures mounted first along China's coast and then in the interior, 
China tried to maintain dominance over its previous colonized states in the west, Tibet 
and Xinjiang, as buffer zones against foreign expansion. The positioning of troops 
garrisoned in Sichuan shows this strategic view as of the 53,000 Banner and New Army 
troops160 stationed in a province with a population of 45 million people,161 almost the 
entire number were either stationed on the border or in eastern Tibet. 
 As Qing foreign policy superseded local Sichuan concerns, Zhao Erfeng’s 
selection as Governor-general exacerbated the intense emotions of the railway protests. 
One reason for this was Sichuan’s unique political situation. In most provinces, a
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provincial governor (xunfu) was in charge of civil administration while a governor-
general (zongdu) was in charge of military affairs over a unit made up of two provinces. 
Sichuan, because of the uneven number of provinces, combined these two functions into 
one office. By the time of the Right's Recovery Movement, Zhao had been heavily 
involved in Tibet for years, where he had been appointed Amban, or Imperial Resident in 
Tibet, in 1908. In his own words, Zhao indicated that his position in Tibet limited his 
understanding of both conditions in Sichuan as well as the world at large.162 
 In addition, the Sichuan elite considered Zhao Erfeng tainted. Although Han and 
not Manchu, he was a member of the Plain Blue Banner.163 This signified his loyalty to 
the regime. In addition, during his brief stint as director of the Railway Company in 1904, 
Zhao spent 2 million taels of railway money on border concerns, including a road into 
Eastern Tibet as well as other military expenditures.164 Worse, Sheng Xuanhai personally 
chose him, wanting a tough administrator for his nationalization program. Adshead writes 
that while “he tried unsuccessfully to avoid the appointment …Sheng Xuanhai, himself 
no politician but a technocrat, felt he needed a strong man and insisted.”165 Zhao still 
believed himself unequal to the task, so he tried to remain his previous station on the 
Tibetan border for as long as possible. As discussed before, he finally arrived in August, 
two months after the protests started. 
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 In order to understand Zhao Erfeng’s actions on September 7th and how this 
played into his subsequent defeat, the military situation in Sichuan must receive a deeper 
analysis. First, I will examine the situation in Tibet, as this was the key to the Qing 
regime’s use of Sichuan in foreign policy. It was also central to their defeat in the 
province. Second, I will analyze the significance of Zhao Erfeng’s indecisiveness which 
kept him from re-establishing control of the situation after the outbreak of rebellion. His 
tenuous relationship with Duanfang is also important in this equation. Finally, the end of 




Sichuan as Imperial Staging Point 
 
 For most of the Qing dynasty, the state maintained a very hands off attitude 
toward Tibet. Wang Xiuyu wrote that “since the 1720's, Tibetan regions had little 
interaction with the Qing state power aside from a few campaigns and a small ambanate. 
Among all of the imperial frontiers, Tibet was unique in that Qing territorial 
administration never reached the extent of its vast regions with the exception of Kham at 
the dynastic end."166 Militarily, the responsibility over Tibet fell to the Chengdu garrison 
in Sichuan. Lhasa held a few garrisoned troops and depots were set up in Kham. Wang 
reiterates the importance of the garrison when he states that: 
In a sense, the Chengdu garrison - apart from the Guangdong garrison - 
marked the farthest extent of permanent Qing banner presence in 
southwestern and southern China. This unique position endowed Sichuan 
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with a singular strategic significance. And that significance, in turn based on 
the contributions of Kham and Lhasa to the Qing formation at the central 
Eurasian front, underscores the importance of the Chengdu-Lhasa belt in 
Qing geopolitics.167 
 
Despite the importance that Tibet had for China, the Tibetan government was becoming 
increasingly independent. Melvyn C. Goldstein noted that "in 1897, two years after the 
thirteenth Dalai Lama assumed political control, he stopped consulting the amban in the 
selection of top officials...and began appointing them directly."168  
 This situation would change radically between the years of 1904 and 1910. Those 
military forces in Sichuan, situated as they were on the Tibetan borderlands, used the 
province as a springboard in Tibet. In 1904, British forces invaded Tibet from British 
controlled India under Lieutenant Colonel Sir Francis Edward Younghusband (1863-
1942). Although he eventually retreated, the Dalai Lama had already fled to Mongolia 
where he appealed for help from the Russian ambassador. This “prompted the Chinese 
government to issue a decree stripping him of his titles and removing him from the office 
of Dalai Lama.” The Amban previous to Zhao tried to take over governmental control, 
but was ignored by the local officials, or lamas, as he lacked sufficient troops.169 
 By 1908, Beijing “invited” the Dalai Lama for a meeting on ending Western 
influence in the region. Intended to discuss the reintegration of Tibet back into Chinese 
suzerainty, these talks accomplished little during that visit.170 When he was finally able to 
return to Lhasa in 1910, he immediately had to flee in the face of a Chinese invasion 
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commanded by Zhao Erfeng. Three hundred cavalry pursued him as he made his way to 
sanctuary in British India.171 “The standard interpretation of the 1910 invasion of Lhasa is 
that it was part and parcel of a consistent forward policy in the last decade of the Qing 
dynasty.”172 In her work on the first stages of the Revolution, Mary Wright states, 
“Chinese troops moved by degrees to occupy the rest of Tibet, including Lhasa. This 
expedition was clearly intended not as an isolated thrust but as a reorganization of Tibet 
under Chinese sovereignty.”173 
 Now able to complete their reorganization of Tibet as a suzerainty of the Empire, 
the Chinese selected a new Dalai Lama, isolated the Panchen Lama, and created a 
separation of church and state. As a result of this, the lamas saw this as foreign intrusions 
threatening their power in the region. Qing activity therefore had the opposite effect, as 
the militant lamas increased attacks along the border. Zhao Erfeng was the one tasked 
with pacifying this area, which included all of eastern Tibet.174 This was the same 
situation that was ongoing in 1911, when the railway protests forced Zhao Erfeng to 
return to Chengdu. 
 
 
The Outbreak of Fighting 
  
 Even to arrest the Movement leadership, Zhao had to call up “1500 to 3000 
veteran soldiers from the Tibetan marches at the end of August with reinforcements on 
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the way.”175 The Gelaohui had called up around 100,000, although this did not prove to 
be immediately successful. In coordination with former Boxers, these units conducted a 
failed joint attack on the capital on September 18-19.176  The arrest of the leadership 
seems to have caught the Protection Movement off guard, despite their successful calls in 
raising the militia. Robert Kapp argues this led to a network of disunified military units 
that were difficult to control and proved more detrimental than helpful.177 As the West 
China Missionary News reported, the fighting was intense, and chaotic, stating: 
It is a story of the raising of the local militia to the aid of the League and 
their gradual massing in four motley armies north, south, east and west and 
their struggle with the regular soldiers; a story of paying off old feuds, of 
robbing homes, kidnapping, ill-treatment of women, the aged and children, 
of burning villages, and suburbs of cities, of looting, rapine, murder, 
slaughter. The ring of cities fell into the hands of the militia and then 
started with capture of Xinjia fell into the hands of the government troops 
again.178 
 
In this situation, Zhao Erfeng had difficulty controlling events, even thinking of 
executing the prisoners. He asked his subordinate, a Manchu general, who advised 
against it, stating that the rebels were achieving considerable success and might want to 
retaliate.179 By November, rumors were beginning to fly: “The foreigners in Chengdu are 
holding meetings and urging the Viceroy to pay them (sic) back the railway loans; the 
Manchus are coming out to slay all Chinese; [and] the Viceroy wants the League leaders 
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arrested September 7th to leave his Yamen and they refuse.”180 These different rumors 
indicate the situation’s uncertainty. 
 Protest leaders had also had difficulty in securing victory. With just a tiny force of 
around 3,000, Zhao Erfeng held Chengdu against large numbers of Gelaohui. Lawton, 
using reports from eyewitnesses, described these extremely disorganized ad-hoc troops. 
He wrote that in a five division contingent of rebel troops “the first carried banners, the 
second bird-guns, the third big cannon taken from cities or newly molded from the iron 
bells and incense urns of the temples, and fourth, clad in armor made from kerosene tins, 
carried ancient spears and swords, while the last consisted of a body of khaki uniformed 
officers.”181 As expected from such a ramshackle force, defeat was constant. Yet, Lawton 
stated that “for some weeks the fortunes of war, in actual engagements, went against the 
rebels; but defeat so far from scattering their forces and destroying their morale, merely 
had the effect of strengthening and consolidating their cause, and spreading the 
agitation.”182 
While the perception of undisciplined Gelaohui units was entirely true in many 
cases, one aspect in which they showed considerable restraint was in their relations with 
foreigners, especially given the historic bad blood that existed between both them and the 
Boxers in their dealings with foreigners. Attacks against foreigners were almost 
nonexistent. The motto for the rebellion in its dealings with foreigners, whether 
missionaries, businessmen or government officials, was “Don't touch the foreigner or his 
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property or our cause is doomed.”183 This indicated that the movement had no desire to 
draw in the Western powers by attacks on foreigners.  
 Examples of the discipline exhibited were abundant. One was the experience of 
the Olsen family in Zhongzhou, in western Sichuan. For two months, the city had been 
assaulted by antirailway party troops, robbers, revolutionaries, and Imperial soldiers one 
after the other. When things settled, rebel militiamen escorted them to Chengdu, where 
they gained passage for themselves down the river to Shanghai.184  Another example was 
that of the last foreigners escorted from Chengdu, including 148 members of the British, 
German, and French Consuls. They paid $2,000 dollars for protection on their journey to 
Yichang with their escort made up of Railway Rights militia, revolutionaries, and 
Gelaohui members. They reached their destination safely, except for a mishap at Hejiang 
Xiang where they received fire by a unit of Qing troops.185 
 With this history, it is quite startling that the Gelaohui did not use this rebellion as 
an excuse to attack missionaries and other foreigners in the confusion. In not doing so, 
however, they achieved two significant goals. First, they understood from prior incidents 
both in Sichuan and the rest of China that any attacks would be detrimental to their cause 
by bringing in foreign troops. Second, this further emphasized that the true enemy of the 
rebellion were not foreign missionaries or foreign powers, but the Qing themselves. The 
weakness of the Qing and their refusal to address these weaknesses became the reason for 
the shift from a desire for constitutional monarchy to a total regime change. 
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While Zhao Erfeng was bogged down in Chengdu and unable to secure a decisive 
victory, he faced other threats from his own side. Duanfang, the Manchu general 
appointed to take charge of the railways was still sitting in Yichang. In Duanfang's view, 
Zhao had mismanaged the protests completely and on August 29th Duanfang 
memorialized the Court to have Zhao impeached and arrested.186 This memorial was the 
main reason for the Court orders forcing Zhao to take action in the first week of 
September that led to the arrests of the protest leadership.187 The increasingly caustic 
situation in Sichuan forced Duanfang to finally take action himself. 
 On October 5, Duanfang took some New Army troops from Wuchang and 
advanced to Wanxian in eastern Sichuan,188 the first time he entered the province. One 
byproduct of this situation was the Wuchang Uprising. The troops that Duanfang used to 
man his army came from the Wuchang garrison. Wu Yuzhang writes that by 1911, nearly 
one third of the nearly 16,000 New Army troops were members of the Literary 
Association, which was a front organization for the Revolutionary Movement. When calls 
for troops came out in September for an expedition to Sichuan, the governor-general 
there saw his chance to rid himself of some of the revolutionary elements. On the ninth of 
October, a bomb inadvertently exploded in a secret bomb making plant in the city. The 
governor-general seized and executed several prisoners taken there and ordered the arrest 
of all other revolutionaries who could be found. He underestimated their numbers, 
however, and in a surprise counterattack the revolutionaries captured Wuchang on 
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October 11th. Five days later the sister cities of Hankou and Hanyang fell to the 
revolutionaries.189  
Back in Sichuan, Duanfang’s army entered Chongqing on October 11th and by the 
end of November was approaching Chengdu.190 After closing in on the outskirts of the 
city, his forces ran into hard opposition and his line of retreat was cut off. S.C. Yang 
reports that when the general failed to push on to Chengdu, his deputy became frustrated 
and led a revolt that killed him.191 Robert Felsing attributed his death to mutiny by 
revolutionary elements that had infiltrated the New Army while in Wuchang.192 The West 
China Missionary News merely reports that on November 27th, the same day Zhao 
surrendered to the new provisional government, “Duanfang executed at Fuzhou, his 
troops leaving with his head.”193 Duanfang's death meant the end of Qing efforts to retake 
Sichuan.  
 The discord between Zhao Erfeng and Duanfang proved to be the death knell of  
 
the military operations of the Qing. In fact, it was for this reason that the rebellion  
 
succeeded as these two focused more on each other than on putting down the rebellion.  
 
During the initial protests over the railway seizure, both Duanfang and Sheng Xuanhuai  
 
came to see Zhao Erfeng as ineffective and possibly treasonous.194 In addition, Zhao had  
 
vacillated from trying to negotiate for the protestors to seeking reason for executing the  
 
nine gentry captives.195 Duanfang’s orders, however, were to arrest Zhao and put down  
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the rebellion by force of arms.196 The acrimony between Zhao and Duanfang reached  
 
fruition when Zhao Erfeng turned over control of the province to the rebels. He did it on  
 
the same day that troops rebelled and executed Duanfang just outside Chengdu. As far as  
 




The End of Revolution 
 
 Recognizing that the situation had gotten out of hand, the Viceroy released the 
nine hostages on November 20th and feasted them in supplication. On the 27th, they 
issued joint proclamations in an effort to pacify the situation.197 At the meeting, Zhao 
Erfeng and the arrested leaders negotiated a change of government with Pu Dianjun as 
the new Governor-general and General Zhu Qinglan (1874~1941) as vice-Governor-
General. In contrast to the organization under the Qing, Zhao Erfeng retained several 
units but the bulk of the army fell under the authority of General Zhu as part of a 
compromise between Pu Dianjun and the army.198 General Yin Changheng (1884-1953), 
a Tongmenghui member, was made Director of War and served as senior military 
commander.199 On November 27th, Zhao Erfeng "placed the Chengdu Great Han Sichuan 
Independent Military Government under the temporary stewardship of Pu Dianjun whom, 
he explained, was a logical choice since he had represented the entire province as 
Assembly President.”200 
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 The end of the government built upon the Railway Movement was as swift as its 
conception. On December 8, 1911, Pu Dianjun scheduled a military review in Chengdu to 
observe the quality of the new Sichuan Army. This was done because of the many 
factions that existed among the troops, creating discord. S.C. Yang wrote that  
The vice-president or vice-governor, Zhu Qinglan, was not a native of 
Sichuan, and the old troops were mostly from other provinces and could not 
agree with the Sichuanese troops. In the Elder Brother Society many of the 
troops were no better than robbers. At this time the Manchus living under the 
“Eight Flags” were in financial difficulties. Formerly the government paid 
their expenses, but who was to be responsible for them under a republic? The 
question arose too, about the gentry and officials who had come from other 
provinces to assist in the Sichuan revolutionary activities. Also, there were 
still two parties, the Revolutionists and the Constitutionalists, and most 
naturally friction broke out between them at many points. Many of these 
questions seemed impossible of speedy solution, especially since the 
governor, Pu Dianjun, was more of a scholar than a politician. So many 
things needed to be decided that if he had had ten months he could not have 
argued them all, and if he had had ten pairs of hands he could not possibly 
have managed so many activities. The most difficult question of all was the 
settlement of the Railway League problems.201 
 
He was not to get a chance, however, as the troops there that day mutinied and began the 
“day of looting.” Yang explains that “the entire day from morning until dark was spent 
firing was indulged in.”202 
 Military order was re-established by General Yin Changheng, elected as the new 
governor and Luo Lun as vice-governor.203 Several scholars have suggested that General 
Yin secretly started the riots himself so as to deliver the province to the Tongmenghui.204  
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204 Qin Qiu and Kefu Jiang, “Zhu Qinglan,” in Minguo renwuchuan [The Biographies of 
Republic People]. Vol. 10, eds. Xin Li and Sibai Sun. (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 2000), 
125. Yin’s history tends to give credence to these rumors. In Juwu Chen, “Yin 
Changheng,” same vol., 41-42, it states that Yin joined the Tongmenghui while as a 
student in Japan. He was later exiled from Guangxi by the government there for his 




Pu Dianjun fled for his life and remained in hiding. Zhao Erfeng ultimately received 
blame for starting the riots as a pretense to regain power. Despite his requests to return to 
his military career on the Tibetan border, the new revolutionary government beheaded 
him on December 28, 1911.205  The Chengdu Great Han Sichuan Independent Military 
Government ended and the Sichuan Military Government took its place. 
 The protest and rebellion with Sichuan and later the rest of the country had a 
significant effect on the Qing court. On October 27th, 1911, they tried to pacify the 
situation with the impeachment of Sheng Xuanhuai, in an effort to use him as a 
scapegoat. Sentenced the next day to execution in absentia, he fled to his seemingly 
erstwhile allies in the foreign legation.206 Despite several successes, such as recapturing 
two of the three Wuhan cities, conditions throughout the nation rapidly unraveled. At 
long last motivated toward constitutionalism, the Qing issued a Nineteen-Article 
Compact that effectively ended imperial rule in China. The leadership of the nation then 
passed to Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) as the new Prime Minister.207 Finding that even this 
was not sufficient, the government ended the Qing dynasty entirely with the founding of 
the Chinese Republic on December 29th and the abdication of the last emperor, Pu Yi 
(1906-1967), on January 20th, 1911.
                                                                                                                                                 
events in 1911 permitted him to rise in the ranks. On p. 124, Qiu and Jiang state that the 
riots were started by lower level officers, with whom Yin would have direct connections. 
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Washington Press, 2000), 184. Yuan Shikai was an important general of the New Army 
created in the last few decades of the Qing. He was also an able politician and opponent 
of Sheng Xuanhuai. After retaining his position on the fall of the Qing, he tried to declare 







The Qing court’s rationale for seizing the Sichuan railroad was two-fold. First, 
they recognized that local resources were not sufficient to construct it. In fact, China’s 
reliance on foreign loans indicates that the central government’s resources at the time 
were equally insufficient. Second, the railway company’s means for collecting revenue 
afflicted the population with onerous taxes for an increasingly futile project. In their 
every action, however, the government ignored local concerns either through ignorance 
or neglect. In addition, Sichuan’s place as rice bowl for the country, treasury, and as a 
strategic base for foreign policy obliged the government to maintain its control. The 
anger from this dichotomy created an increased desire for economic and political rights 
as articulated by China’s leading reformer, Liang Qichao. Despite this, the central 
government ultimately surrendered the very thing the local populace had strived to 
preserve – sovereignty from foreign powers. It is not without irony that the mechanism 
intended for Sichuan’s further integration with the rest of China – the railroad – was the 
last provocation in causing Sichuan’s separation from the Qing. 
 The government’s own economic decisions contrived to set up the conditions for 
their nationalization program. Xiliang had, in accordance with the plan initially drawn up 
by the students abroad, instituted the three pillars for financing the project. The zugu was 
the main pillar, but it relied equally on private donations and the tax on opium. Zhao 




forcing a heavier reliance on the zugu. Corruption would decimate the funding the project 
received from private donors. Unfortunately, these private donors were the true measure 
of confidence in building the railway, providing more ammunition for the government’s 
criticism. Local leaders, desperate to see the railway completed, saw the zugu as the only 
remaining option for raising railway capital. That these taxes came from every stratum of 
Sichuan society meant that the populace considered themselves owners of the railway, 
despite the lack of progress in its construction.  
As devastating as the corruption proved to the railway construction effort, it did 
provide an opportunity for the returned students to acquire more political access. The 
anticorruption campaign and the elections giving them control of the provincial assembly, 
both efforts led by Pu Dianjun, allowed these former student leaders to create a 
semblance of local power and control. This façade was destroyed, however, when Zhao 
Erxun, the provincial governor at the time, curtailed their power within the assembly. 
Later, the central government’s rejection of their protests of the railway seizure displayed 
the insignificance of their concerns in national policy. In the context of Sichuan politics, 
the government’s inability to maintain its own sovereignty in the face of foreign political 
pressure over railway loans was only slightly more vexing than the Qing state’s role in 
relation to foreign missionaries. It was now clear to the emerging Sichuan public that 
foreigners had more access and sway in the imperial court than the apprehensions of 
provincial elites. This disregard drove the elites into the arms of the one association that 
had shown a willingness to take on the foreign powers and their assumed missionary 
emissaries, the Gelaohui.  




the interaction between the weakened Qing government and provincial political forces in 
the collapse of the dynasty. Yet how unique was Sichuan? Other provinces experienced 
government negligence, corruption, and the contraction of government services in the 
aftermath of the Taiping Civil War. This showed in many ways an even higher disregard 
for local concerns, as the people were left to fend for themselves after almost total 
devastation. Other areas had suffered greatly in building their railways, only to have them 
seized in the same nationalization program. Railway rights movements sprung up in 
several provinces, but Sichuan was the only one to transition from protest to armed 
conflict over the railway seizure. This was because Sichuan’s funding of the railway 
provided a level of ownership unmatched by other railway projects and Sheng 
Xuanhuai’s betrayal over restitution. In the lead up to the revolutionary events of 1911 in 
Sichuan, the Qing’s determination to retain supremacy in Tibet by stationing almost the 
entire Sichuan garrison were of even greater consequence than either economics or 
politics. The selection of Zhao Erfeng as Governor-general reinforced this priority.  
During his tenure as the railway company chairman, provincial military commander, and 
as Governor-general, he had focused almost exclusively on Tibet to the detriment of 
Sichuan. 
 When armed conflict broke out subsequent to the arrest of Pu Dianjun and his 
fellow provincial leaders, the rebels had a severe disadvantage in military capability. 
Although they could call up around 100,000 passionate volunteers, they were poorly 
armed and organized. Because of this, Zhao Erfeng, with a force less than one-tenth in 
size, held off this rebel army besieging Chengdu for about two months. This created a 




necessary to quell the rebellion and the rebel army provide incapable of taking the 
capital. Duanfang’s expedition would have broken this stalemate, but Zhao Erfeng’s fear 
of an arrest order forced a change in relations with the rebel leadership. Although he 
initially wanted to execute the nine hostages, Zhao negotiated the surrender of central 
government forces to them just before Duanfang reached the capital. Despite Zhao’s 
fears, Duanfang was killed on the same day, negating any military contribution his forces 
could have made at the scene. Victory for the provincial leadership therefore did not 
come through military success, but because the two imperial commanders were at odds.  
 Although the battle over the railway was the spark for the anti-Qing protest 
movement described by Zheng Xiaowei, its foundations were laid over the previous two 
years as a politicalized public, consisting of a new elite leadership in conjunction with 
secret society members from every level of society, emerged in reaction to one central 
government sleight after another. The railway seizure was the last in a series of 
altercations between provincial leaders and the central Qing government over economic 
and political rights. Government interference in both of these areas provided motivation 
for protest participation, with Qing military disarray contributing to its success. This 
experience made Sichuan singular, in that its population was already revolutionary at the 
outbreak of conflict while agitators in the rest of China were first rebelling in order to 
transform society. Despite how Sichuan’s creation of a unique, unified political 
movement, the implications of how government policy affected relations between 
provincial government and gentry in other provinces would provide a deeper 
understanding of the 1911 Revolution. This would be beneficial to other scholars in that 




government failures as much as a desire for public participation. In the end for China, 
however, Sichuan, for all its isolation, lends credence to S.C. Yang’s words that “when 
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